Bargaining in the Photonics Industry by Burger, Markus & Sydow, Jörg
   
	 1
How Inter-organizational Networks Can Become Path-dependent:  
Bargaining in the Photonics Industry* 
 
 
Markus Burger & Jörg Sydow 
Dept of Management 
Freie Universität Berlin 
Boltzmannstr. 20 





This paper investigates how path dependence may come about in inter-organizational 
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the photonics industry. We use qualitative interviews and content analysis to reconstruct the 
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INTRODUCTION 
Networks have traditionally been characterised as flexible forms of organization (Powell, 
1990). However, it has recently been suspected that inter-organizational networks may also 
become inert over time (Kim, Oh, & Swaminathan, 2006), possibly even become path-
dependent (Manning & Sydow, 2011; Maurer & Ebers, 2006). Our general research question 
therefore asks under exactly what circumstances such networks may become path-dependent. 
While one source of path dependence may of course be the organizations participating in an 
inter-organizational network (Walker, Kogut, & Shan, 1997), we highlight the contribution of 
“relational practices” (Ness, 2009). More specifically, we focus on one particular type of 
relational or network management practices: bargaining practices. Bargaining occurs when 
two or more parties can jointly create a cooperative surplus but need to coordinate a way of 
distributing it amongst themselves (Muthoo, 1999; Nash, 1950; Rubinstein, 1982). Bargaining 
practices, then, are recurrent activities through which the network partners agree to identify 
and distribute their cooperative surplus.  
Bargaining practices are especially suitable for studying inter-organizational path 
dependence because they – by definition – emerge from the interactions of two or more 
organizations and can be assumed to become inert after a while because the organizations get 
used to the practices, routinize them and are even likely to adopt other management practices 
that fit the focal bargaining practices. But under what conditions exactly do they become not 
only inert but path-dependent? In order to answer this research question, we first recapitulate 
the theory of organizational path dependence and present an operationalization of this theory 
with the help of indicators that are suitable to depict the development of an organizational 
path in general and of the path dependence of bargaining practices in inter-organizational 
networks in particular. After introducing the research setting – three regional networks in the 
photonics industry in Germany – and our methods, we present our results case by case. In the 
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final section we compare and discuss these results and the limitations of the study. Major 
contributions of this study are not only the operationalization of the theory of organizational 
path dependence but also the extension of this theory to the network level of analysis. 
 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
Organizational Path Dependence 
This paper uses a framework that is based upon the emerging theory of organizational path 
dependence (Sydow, Schreyögg, & Koch, 2009). Path dependence theory is concerned with 
explaining stable – i.e. repeatedly occurring – phenomena. The basic claim of this theory, 
which is based upon the seminal works by David (1985) and Arthur (1994) and more recent 
modifications by institutional theorists (North, 1990; Pierson, 2000), is that (some cases of) 
stability can be explained by a specific dynamic marked by three distinct phases: the 
preformation phase, the path formation phase, and the actual lock-in phase. In the 
preformation phase, a number of alternative organizational solutions are available and one or 
several ‘small events’ trigger the initial adoption of one of them. In the path formation phase, 
this initially adopted solution is used increasingly because of at least one self-reinforcing 
mechanism; correspondingly, alternative solutions are excluded increasingly. In the lock-in 
phase, the focal organizational or inter-organizational solution is rigidly replicated and 
alternatives become nearly – but not totally – extinct. All three phases are summarized in the 
following figure 1. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
-------------------------------------------- 
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In order to apply this model to specific empirical cases we need to operationalize its abstract 
definitions. Towards this end, we will derive three empirical indicators for each of these three 
phases. Indicators are an intermediary step between abstract concepts and actual evidence of 
practices: on the one hand, they are derived from the abstract phases of path dependence; on 
the other hand, they are measureable and therefore provide guidance for empirical analyses.  
According to the theory of path dependence, the path formation phase is characterized 
by “an initial scope of choice” (Sydow et al., 2009: 692). Hence, a first indicator of a 
preformation phase implies that there must have been at least one theoretically available 
alternative to the one that developed into the organizational path – otherwise the solution 
would be deterministic (Indicator I1). Although the presence of such an alternative needs to 
hold for the subsequent path phases as well, we attach this indicator to the preformation phase 
because it is the precondition to starting any empirical path analysis and should therefore top 
the list of indicators. A second indicator is that one or several alternatives need to have been 
not only theoretically but also practically viable – otherwise a path interpretation is purely 
hypothetical (I2). The third indicator concerns the end of a preformation phase. A small 
contingent event needs to be discernible (I3), that is, “… an event that was not expected to 
take place, given certain theoretical understandings of how causal processes work” (Mahoney, 
2000: 531), which triggered decisions or actions influencing the alternative to follow. An 
event is contingent if it is neither deterministic (‘necessary’) nor random. 
The path formation phase is characterised by the self-reinforcing dynamic of positive 
feedback, which is at the core of the theory of organizational paths (Sydow et al., 2009: 698) 
and similarly possesses three theoretical features. First, the fundamental idea of ‘self-
reinforcement’ is that “… the increase of a particular variable leads to a further increase of 
this very variable” (Sydow et al., 2009: 694). Hence we must be able to measure, at the very 
least, two consecutive increases of the same variable (I4). Second, some self-reinforcing 
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mechanism must explain how the first increase leads to the second increase (I5). Various 
mechanisms have been suggested in this context and the next section will analyze how they 
can be disentangled. Third, there must be some but fewer alternatives available than during 
the preformation phase, i.e. the number of practically viable alternatives and/or their 
probabilities needs to diminish (I6). 
An (organizational) lock-in is defined as “… a preferred action pattern which gets 
deeply embedded in organizational practice and replicated” (Sydow et al., 2009: 694). Again, 
three theoretical features are implied for the lock-in phase. First, replication requires that a 
nearly identical solution has been used at least twice but ideally more often (I7). Second, it 
has to be shown that practically viable alternatives are ruled out further (I8) – i.e. that 
alternatives are even fewer or even less likely than in the preceding path formation phase – 
but also that there is still ‘some scope for variation’ (Sydow et al., 2009: 695). Third, the 
degree of inertia of the alternative reproduced needs to be distinguished (I9, Jonsson & 
Regnér, 2009): ‘unaware’ indicates that alternatives exist but are not perceived by the actors; 
‘unwilling’ indicates that alternatives exist but that the actors involved do not want to pursue 
them; ‘unable’ indicates that the implementation of existing alternatives fails.  
Altogether, this operationalization of the three-stage model of organizational path 
dependence yields nine theoretical features and their corresponding empirical indicators. 
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The most complex indicator to show empirically is indicator number five, i.e. that one 
self-reinforcing mechanism at the very least explains the two consecutive increases of a 
variable. As stated above, self-reinforcing mechanisms have the property that a ‘first increase’ 
in a variable leads to a further ‘second increase’ of the same variable. Self-reinforcing 
mechanisms drive the path-like development of an organizational solution from its inception 
at the triggering event to its eventual lock-in. Correspondingly, at the start of a self-
reinforcing mechanism an organizational solution has been put into practice at least once – 
self-reinforcing mechanisms ‘only’ explain the continuation and expansion of a once 
established solution but not its inception. 
Though heavily debated and varying from one to more than a dozen (Beyer, 2010), the 
literature on organizational paths suggests four main self-reinforcing mechanisms through 
which paths can develop: coordination effects, complementarities, learning effects and 
adaptive expectations (Sydow et al., 2009). In the following, we will focus our attention on 
coordination effects and complementarities, which seem by far the most likely mechanisms 
driving (inter-) organizational path dependence of bargaining practices. Coordination effects 
are relevant because any change to a once established distribution of the joint surplus will 
disfavour at least one partner, who may threaten to terminate the relationship. Anticipating 
such a reaction, no partner will initiate a change in the first place so that a once established 
solution perpetuates itself. Complementarities are likely because a successful network may 
see an ever increasing fit of its members’ contributions to the joint surplus. Focusing on 
coordination effects and complementarities does not imply, however, that learning effects and 
adaptive expectations have no role to play in a potentially path-dependent development of 
bargaining practices. Nonetheless, we had to limit our focus to make our overall research 
manageable and presentable. We will now outline general, abstract definitions of both 
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mechanisms and translate these first into necessary conditions and then into sub-indicators 
that need to hold when the mechanisms are at work. 
 
Coordination Effects 
Coordination effects “build on the benefits of rule-guided behavior: the more actors adopt and 
apply a specific institution (i.e. an organizational rule or routine), the more efficient the 
interaction among these actors is, since the behavior of the actors is rule guided and can 
therefore be anticipated and reactions can be considered in advance” (Sydow et al., 2009: 
699).  
Coordination effects have been formally defined by game theorists (Cooper, 1999; 
Rasmusen, 1994). We will analyze a slight alteration of the standard coordination game – the 
‘bargaining game’ – to derive two necessary conditions for coordination effects and their 
corresponding empirical indicators. We will then show how coordination effects contribute to 
the self-reinforcing stability of bargaining practices.  
 A simple bargaining game is depicted in Figure 3. In this example, both players are 
asked to share a pie of size 1. If they both make equal demands, no one will receive any 
payoffs so that they are left with the so-called ‘disagreement point’ of 0 each. If the players 
make corresponding demands (i.e. ‘low’ and ‘HIGH’ or ‘LOW’ and ‘high’), the player asking 
for the high share receives two thirds of the pie and the other player the remaining one third. 
These are also the two pure strategy equilibria (Rasmusen, 1994).  
 
-------------------------------------------- 
INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE 
-------------------------------------------- 
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As can be seen from the payoff matrix, both players prefer not to deviate unilaterally 
once an equilibrium is reached. Assume we are at the top-right equilibrium in which player 1 
plays ‘low’ and player 2 plays ‘HIGH’. If – on the one hand – player 2 single-handedly 
lowers its demands to ‘LOW’, he would be left worse off with the disagreement point payoff 
of 0. If – on the other hand – player 1 unilaterally raises its demand to ‘high’ then he risks the 
continuation of the overall relationship and hence a disagreement point payoff of 0. Thus, we 
are not likely to observe unilateral deviations in any direction by any party. Instead, a once 
established pattern becomes self-perpetuating. This leads to the first indicator of coordination 
effects (I5a): a unilateral deviation will not be attempted by either side.  
Moreover, in a bargaining game the players’ strategies are strategic substitutes 
(Bulow, Geanakoplos, & Klemperer, 1985). That is, an increase of one player’s demand 
strategy gives the other player an incentive to lower its demand. This can be explained as 
follows: assume we start from the same equilibrium in which player 1 plays ‘low’ and player 
2 plays ‘HIGH’. If player 1 raised his demand from ‘low’ to ‘high’, then player 2 should 
reduce his demand correspondingly from ‘HIGH’ to ‘LOW’, as this would still leave him 
better off than the disagreement payoff. Hence player 2 has to ‘substitute’ the increase of 
player 1’s demand strategy. 
The fact that strategies are strategic substitutes implies that at least one person is made 
worse off if we move away from any equilibrium. From this follows that a joint deviation to 
any other equilibrium will leave at least one party worse off. As it is likely that such a losing 
party would oppose this move, there should also be no successful attempts at joint deviations. 
Thus, a solution that is found once should be self-perpetuating, which may provide a possible 
explanation of path dependence. This leads us to the second indicator of coordination effects 
(I5b): a joint deviation will not be attempted. 




Complementarities are defined as “… a synergy resulting from the interaction of two or more 
separate but interrelated resources, rules, or practices” (Sydow et al., 2009: 699). Thus, two 
activities are complementary if their output does not simply add up but additionally leads to a 
synergy. Thus, the fundamental property of complementarities can be expressed with the 
formula k1 + k2 < k1+2. A synergy therefore indicates the existence of complements.  
One way of measuring the presence of a synergy – and thereby of complements – is by 
showing that a substitution of inputs is not advisable. Two input factors are complements if 
one partner cannot compensate for a decrease of the other party’s input factor by increasing 
his own input factor. For instance, one could run the hypothetical thought experiment about 
what would happen if one player removed his contribution from the partnership. If it turns out 
that the other player can easily replace the first player’s input by his own means, then it is 
unlikely that they form a complementary relationship. If, on the other hand, the other player 
cannot replace the first player’s input at all or only with great effort, then one can speak of a 
complementary relationship. It follows that the absence of substitutes is a necessary condition 
for the presence of synergies. It therefore represents a first measureable indicator of a 
mechanism operating through complementarities (I5c).  
Complementarities are self-reinforcing because they provide an incentive to engage 
repeatedly in the same action and reap the benefits of the synergy instead of exploring 
alternatives. “In complementary settings self-reinforcing processes occur when routines 
and/or practices are interconnected in such a way that it becomes ever more attractive to 
exploit the synergies or—when referring to the reverse side—to save misfit costs caused by 
solutions deviating from the established cluster/organizational capability“ (Sydow et al., 
2009: 699). In inter-organizational cooperations, this leads to a virtuous cycle: the investment 
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of one partner in the mutual business relation provides an incentive to his counterpart to 
invest as well. This second investment, in turn, provides a reason for the first partner to 
increase his initial investment. This "virtuous cycle" forms the second measurable indicator of 
a self-reinforcing mechanism based on complementarities (I5d). Figure 4 below summarizes 
this discussion by showing the four indicators of self-reinforcing mechanisms, two each for 
coordination effects and complementarities. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
RESEARCH SETTING AND METHODS 
Our empirical setting is the photonics industry in Germany. This industry provides a 
particularly suitable field for studying the development dynamics of bargaining practices and 
their potential path dependence. In this industry, joint product development in inter-
organizational networks is very common, as most organizations are extremely specialised 
small- and medium-sized companies that need to pool their expertise and components to 
develop new devices for new applications. Cooperation is therefore a frequent phenomenon, 
and the networks are even quite heterarchical, so that the terms of mutual cooperations 
actually get negotiated. 
While the appropriate methodology to study organizational path dependence is still 
debated (e.g. Koch, 2011; Vergne & Durand, 2010), we use a qualitative case-study design 
(Yin, 1994) with three cases, all of which show a rather stable pattern in their bargaining 
practices, giving us enough reason for an initial path suspicion. A qualitative research 
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methodology is especially suited to our purpose: “As scholars have increasingly begun to 
appreciate the role of dynamic processes (e.g. path dependency or evolutionary processes), 
rich longitudinal research is needed to provide the details of how these processes actually play 
out” (Siggelkow, 2007: 22). Each case – our unit of analysis – is a regional network of 
photonic organizations in Germany. Cases were selected if joint product development 
occurred frequently (so that potential instances of bargaining occurred), and all network 
members were willing to share business sensitive information with the researchers (which 
was of course anonymized for this paper).  
Empirical data was collected to reconstruct the development processes of bargaining 
practices and to subsequently analyze them regarding their path dependence. A semi-
structured questionnaire was designed and pilot-tested. In each network, the managers of 
either all or the most crucial member organizations were interviewed, resulting in 22 
interviews. Interviews lasted between one and two hours and were later transcribed and 
anonymized, producing approximately 650 pages of text. Additional sources like websites, 
newspaper articles and meeting notes were collected to triangulate the interview information. 
Even more importantly, we were able to build upon previous insights gathered in this field for 
almost a decade.  
The transcripts were analyzed using multi-level content analysis (Mayring, 2000). In a 
first round of encoding, descriptive codes were assigned to the text to signify the content, 
timing and actors involved. Subsequently, chronological thick-descriptions were written for 
each network (Jarzabkowski, 2008), resulting in another 300 pages of text. A ‘pattern-
matching’ approach was then used to analyze the development of the bargaining practices 
(Yin, 1994). ‘Pattern-matching’ means that the actual bargaining practices were checked to 
see if they exhibited the patterns associated with each of the empirical path indicators. We 
encoded and tabulated all supportive and inhibitive quotes for the empirical indicators in a 
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second round of coding. An indicator was judged 'present' in a given bargaining practice when 
the events in the chronology provided supporting evidence.  
 
RESULTS 
All three inter-organizational networks create a joint surplus by coordinating the individual 
activities of their member organizations so that they can jointly manufacture and sell 
innovative high-tech products. In each network, the high-tech components of individual 
organizations are combined into sophisticated joint devices. The process of value creation 
goes hand in hand with a method of value distribution; we will take a closer look at three 
aspects of it. First, we look at who does what. Since members of all three networks 
manufacture constitutive components that are combined later, a central bargaining issue is 
which manufacturing tasks are assigned to which network member. Secondly, we look at 
network-internal transactions. To assemble joint devices, the usual procedure is that one 
network member sells its component to another member, which acts as an integrator 
company. During this network-internal transaction, so-called gains from trade are created. 
That is, the buyer values the exchanged goods or service at a higher price than the seller. The 
bargaining issue is therefore who gets what share of this valuation difference. Third, we look 
at the way (dis)agreements are codified. For instance, the allocation of tasks can simply be 
based on an oral agreement or be written down in detailed contracts. Before we turn to these 
issues, we will outline the genesis and development of each of the networks. We will then 
conclude each case with a path analysis of its bargaining practice.  
 
Case study A: The “Surface Network”  
Surface Network consists of four optical component producers located in a region of Northern 
Germany: Alpha, Beta, Gamma and Delta. Alpha is the biggest company with roughly 100 
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employees. Beta and Gamma both have about 30 employees, and Delta has seven. Figure 5 
displays Surface Network, also indicating different firm sizes (as measured by full time 
employees (FTEs)) and tie strengths (as measured by subjective evaluations of interviewees) 
between the firms of the network. 
The common goal of Surface Network members is to combine their individual 
expertise to produce devices that use components from each member company. Today, they 
jointly produce highly sophisticated scientific devices worth several million dollars for natural 
scientists wanting to analyse the physical attributes of surfaces on a nanometre level. In order 
to achieve this end, they have developed a sophisticated collaboration routine: Surface 
Network gets external requests from customers to build tailor-made devices that use 
components from all the network companies. Once a client places an order, manufacturing 
tasks for individual components are distributed among the network members by a so-called 
lead partner. The lead partner then continues to buy those components from the others, who 
act as network-internal suppliers. 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
INSERT FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
Such a practice was suspected to be self-reinforcing because as soon as the members have 
coordinated one way of working together, it seems unlikely that a unilateral (I5a)1 or joint 
deviation (I5b) would be possible without harming at least one partner. 
  
																																																								
1 I5a means indicator 5a as outlined in the theory section. 
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Genesis of the network: This practice took years to develop. Initially, the network members 
only worked together sporadically and without any ulterior motive. Surface Network was 
founded by Alpha around the millennium. At this time, international research universities 
were increasingly demanding complex systems that combined several specialised components 
in one device. As Alpha did not have all the necessary technologies in-house it initiated 
Surface Network as a means to “… be as big as necessary on spot – definite client, definite 
terrain, definite technology” (Quote from Alpha). 
Alpha selected Beta and Gamma as the initial members of Surface Network; Delta 
became a member in 2005. Initially, manufacturing tasks were distributed according to the 
competencies of the network members and included one overlap: Alpha produced registration 
components. Beta and Gamma both produced different types of modification techniques. 
Delta produced a high energy component. Additionally, Alpha formulated some "ideal goals" 
for the network, including a distribution of tasks without overlaps and an exchange of 
ownership shares.  
 
Development over time: Alpha deliberately designed the network to be “adaptive to outside 
circumstances” and rejected the option to establish a system of elaborate contracts between 
the partners. This meant that relational practices in general and bargaining practices in 
particular were not deliberately designed but were allowed instead to emerge from the 
interactions between the actors. In the subsequent ‘trial and error’ period, the network 
members tested which bargaining arrangements were working for them. For instance, the 
initial distribution of manufacturing tasks was once contested by Alpha when it tried to 
redistribute some highly profitable tasks from Gamma to Beta. Alpha justified this attempt by 
claiming that Beta was more capable of performing the tasks than Gamma, so that the overall 
network would benefit from a further specialisation of its members. This attempt failed, 
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however, because Gamma did not agree to it. On the one hand, Gamma disagreed regarding 
Beta’s alleged superiority and instead insisted that their capabilities could match Beta’s. On 
the other hand, Gamma expected a loss in profits if it gave up some tasks and no alternative 
compensation could be found. Regarding internal supplies during the ‘trial and error’ period, 
the network agreed on transfer prices 25% below list prices that have been reproduced in the 
actual prices ever since. The distribution patterns of Surface Network are not codified in 
contracts or other documents but instead rely on oral agreements and actual practising. All 
interview partners highlighted the fact that contracts are not capable of codifying the trustful 
relationships that Surface Network is based on. In one case, the wish to sign a contract was 
even interpreted as a sign of mistrust. 
Surface Network has grown substantially since its inception. Initial purchase orders 
were small and provided a means to test the modes of cooperation among the partners. Today, 
Surface Network is capable of processing orders in the region of up to two million Euros. At 
the same time, a noticeable asymmetry has developed. While Alpha has grown by almost 
400% since the start of the network, its partners have only experienced growth between 50% 
and 100%.  
 
Path analysis: A path analysis of Surface Network reveals that all three phases of path 
development can be found. The three indicators of a preformation phase are present: as 
required by the theory of organizational path dependence, there used to be initial alternatives 
to the bargaining practice (I1). For instance, Alpha had considered an elaborate system of 
contracts (before dismissing the idea). Moreover, it outlined a series of "inner goals" that were 
later on attempted (I2). In the "trial and error" period, the network members tested which 
bargaining arrangements were working for them. It can thus be interpreted as a series of 
"small events" (I3).  
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Moreover, there is evidence of the indicators of a path formation phase. The 
bargaining practice has been applied with subsequent increases in the volume of orders that 
Surface Network could process (I4). Simultaneously, in the trial and error period, some 
alternative modes of distribution and cooperation were dismissed so that the number of 
alternatives diminished (I6).  
Most importantly, self-reinforcing mechanisms based on coordination effects as well 
as complementarities can be discerned in the development trajectory of Surface Network. As 
outlined in the theory section, indicator I5a of coordination effects requires that no partner 
successfully deviates from a once established bargaining practice. Indeed, Alpha’s attempt to 
redistribute some tasks from Gamma to Beta failed. This supports the conclusion that 
coordination effects had stabilized the initial distribution of tasks. Complementarities have 
also stabilised the bargaining practice. As also outlined in the theory section, indicator 5c of 
complementarities requires that no company substitutes the capabilities of their partners. All 
network members highlight the fact that it is necessary to cooperate with their partners in 
order to fulfil the clients’ desires for sophisticated devices that combine several components. 
At the same time, the members point out that they are unable to reproduce their partners’ 
manufacturing abilities in-house, as they lack their expertise.  
There are also some indications that the current bargaining practice is locked-in: there 
have been attempts to make changes to the current practice – yet those failed (I7). At the same 
time, alternatives have continued to disappear (I8). For instance, a dissolution of the network 
is now almost impossible, as many customers perceive Surface Network as one entity. The 
partners are "unwilling" to change the status quo (I9) because they all profit from their 
collaborative venture. They are also “unable” to unilaterally change the bargaining practice as 
exemplified by Alpha’s failed attempt to redistribute manufacturing tasks. 
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Case study B: The “X-Ray Network” 
X-Ray Network consists of 13 companies and research institutes in a region in Eastern 
Germany (see figure 6). The network organizations have highly specialised R&D and 




INSERT FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
The common goal of the network is to combine their individual components in order to 
manufacture sophisticated devices for specific application purposes that yield high profit 
margins, e.g. an X-ray analysis of solar cells. Today, the network members are very 
successful at doing so, jointly generating an annual revenue of more than €20 mio. Thus, the 
network members complement each other and the resulting benefit is distributed among them. 
Moreover, they have devised a complex coordination process called “roadmapping” that 
enables them to identify, evaluate and implement joint opportunities. This successful practice 
was suspected to be self-reinforcing because the network members increasingly complement 
each other, hindering alterations to the technology promoted as well as the way the resulting 
benefit is distributed among them. 
 
Genesis of the network: Again, the successful practice took years to develop. In the 1990s, the 
X-ray competencies in Berlin were dispersed and uncoordinated. Prior to the reunification of 
Germany, two separate X-ray communities existed in East and West Berlin. After the fall of 
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the Wall, many researchers in the former East founded their own companies or were 
transferred to newly established research institutes.  
X-Ray Network emerged during the mid-1990s. In 1994, the still influential leader of 
a former East German research institute founded his own company. He orchestrated the X-ray 
actors of Berlin to work jointly on a project aimed at creating a revolutionary generation of X-
ray detectors that could work at room temperatures, thus avoiding expensive cooling systems. 
For the new generation of detectors to unfold their potential, several new components had to 
be developed in parallel: new X-ray sources, new X-ray optics, new X-ray stimulation units, 
new software and new electronics. During this initial project, development tasks were 
allocated to network members according to their expertise. For instance, the company X-
Instruments (an anonym) started the development of the detector and its electronics, 
Kapillarsys (an anonym) started the development of the optics and the stimulation units, and 
X-Tubes (also an anonym) started the development of X-ray sources. At the end of the project 
in 1997, substantial headway had been made on these developments, yet no marketable device 
had been constructed. Correspondingly, to that date there had been no need for negotiating 
terms for network-internal supplies or for drafting contracts. 
 
Development over time: The first sophisticated device was engineered and manufactured in 
the next joint project that lasted from 1999 to 2001. Its goal was to develop a mobile X-ray 
device for the analysis of paintings by old masters. Initially, tasks were distributed in the same 
way as in the first project, with X-Instruments in charge of developing the detector and 
electronics, Kapillarsys in charge of developing the optics and the stimulation unit, and X-
Tubes in charge of developing the sources. It was also initially agreed upon that X-
Instruments would market the new device, as it was the only member of X-Ray Network that 
had the international sales team necessary for such a venture.  
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During the second project, the initial distribution of manufacturing tasks was 
unilaterally challenged by X-Instruments when it decided to manufacture a stimulation unit 
itself and equip all X-ray devices with it, thus making Kapillarsys' development obsolete. 
After some period of disagreement, Kapillarsys ultimately agreed to this substitution but 
required the following three types of compensation. First, X-Instruments had to buy all optics 
for the mobile X-ray device from Kapillarsys at a favourable price. Second, Kapillarsys was 
allowed to buy detectors from X-Instruments at a favourable rate. Third, Kapillarsys and X-
Instruments were both given the right to manufacture new devices for new applications that 
combined the new detector with its complementary parts. All three provisions were codified 
in a supplementary agreement. 
After 2001, X-Ray Network officially became part of OpTecBB, a from then on state-
supported regional cluster of optics companies and research institutes. Within this official 
structure, the member organizations started to develop "roadmaps" that laid out plans of how 
the individual components were going to be developed and how the components could be 
combined to produce new devices for new applications. Roadmaps were written in 2003 and 
2006, each with a five-year planning horizon. The roadmaps led to further generations of the 
detector and its complementary components. It was also discussed whether the whole network 
should form a virtual company and sell the lucrative devices jointly. However, the network 
stuck to the arrangement in which new devices were either manufactured by X-Instruments or 
Kapillarsys.  
Internal deliveries between the network members were never exclusive. Even though 
the overall network never did recommend any discounts between the companies, the network 
members still decided to grant each other favourable terms bilaterally. Such terms were never 
fixed in framework contracts or similar written documents but instead relied on oral 
commitments. 
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Path analysis: The development of the bargaining practice of X-Ray Network provides 
evidence of all three phases of organizational path dependence. To begin with, the three 
indicators of a preformation phase can be shown. Stimulation units were first produced by 
Kapillarsys only and later by both Kapillarsys and X-Instruments, thus indicating that at least 
two alternative allocations of manufacturing tasks had not only been discussed (I1) but even 
attempted (I2). The supplementary compensation agreement between X-Instruments and 
Kapillarsys established the allocation of manufacturing tasks that has been reproduced ever 
since, thus forming the "small event" that triggered the further development of the bargaining 
practice (I3). Moreover, the official foundation of X-Ray Network in 2001 established the 
roadmapping process as the common framework of action. 
The three indicators of a path formation phase can also be discerned. Once the 
supplementary agreement had allocated the manufacturing tasks, this pattern was adopted 
increasingly by the actors during the time of the roadmap (I4). In all projects initiated during 
the roadmap years, X-Instruments was in charge of developing better detectors, Kapillarsys 
improved its X-ray optics, X-Tubes continued to improve its X-ray tubes, and device 
manufacturing was done by either X-Instruments or Kapillarsys. At the same time, 
alternatives like the "virtual company" were ruled out (I6). 
The successive stabilisation of the allocation of tasks was driven by self-reinforcing 
coordination effects and complementarities. When X-Instruments unilaterally deviated from 
the initial allocation of tasks by taking over the production of stimulation units, it could not 
simply go on with business as usual but had to compensate Kapillarsys for this. This indicates 
that a pure unilateral deviation was always impossible, which is in accordance with indicator 
5a of coordination effects. Similarly, the joint deviation that both partners agreed on was not 
simply a zero-sum redistribution of tasks but included a compensatory deal. Hence, a “pure” 
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joint deviation was also impossible as predicted by indicator 5b. Instead, compensation had to 
be paid in order to win over Kapillarsys. After the compensatory agreement between X-
Instrument and Kapillarsys was signed, no further unilateral or joint deviations have occurred, 
thus indicating the presence of coordination effects (I5a and I5b). Similarly, no network 
partner has substituted any of their partners’ capabilities (I5c). This indicates that – in line 
with indicator 5c – complementarities have sustained the bargaining practice. Instead of 
substituting each other, all partners have stuck to their assigned development tasks and have 
been engaged in a mutually beneficial upward spiral in which the investment of one partner 
into his specialty component enables the other partners to follow suit with theirs, hence 
allowing all network members to produce another lucrative generation of devices with new 
fields of applications and better technical parameters. This pattern of a “virtuous cycle” 
indicates complementarities as outlined in indicator 5d. 
Today, the bargaining practice, which has been replicated ever since the 
supplementary agreement, appears to be locked-in (I7). No alternatives have been attempted 
on a network level, although individual companies still work with other partners outside the 
network in different arrangements. Alternatives to the bargaining practices have 
correspondingly been reduced in the network, yet have not completely vanished (I8). Lastly, 
the partners seem to be "unwilling" to leave their virtuous cycle of new generations of product 
developments (I9). 
 
Case study C: The “Photonics Network”  
Photonics Network consists of over 40 companies and research institutes in a Northern region 
of Germany. In this paper, we will focus on only one major development of Photonics 
Network, the so-called “fibre-to-the-home” (FTTH) household access points. The goal of this 
new technology is to develop and produce modems that allow households to be directly 
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connected to glass fibre networks, thus omitting traditional solutions based on copper and 
multiplying the current rate of data transmission by several orders of magnitude. Figure 7 
represents Photonics Network; the companies and research institutes involved in developing 




INSERT FIGURE 7 ABOUT HERE 
-------------------------------------------- 
FTTH is still a technology “under construction”, as many of its production parameters are not 
yet finalized. It was suspected that a technological decision might stabilise the distribution of 
manufacturing tasks and thus the bargaining practice. Moreover, once a supply chain is 
established for the manufacturing of FTTH-access points there is reason to believe that a once 
adopted solution will be repeated and alternative solutions will be increasingly ruled out.  
 
Genesis of the network: The first FTTH-project started in 2005 and lasted until 2008. A 
cooperation agreement was signed by all members of the project team, as required by the 
sponsoring government body. However, this agreement was a rather loose declaration of 
intentions to work together. The goal of the project was to evaluate potential FTTH-access 
technologies for their cost-effectiveness and their potential for mass production. Several 
alternatives were initially debated: (1) using existing manufacturing technologies and 
transferring all production capacity to cheap labour countries in Asia, (2) automating existing 
technologies and building the manufacturing facilities in Germany, or (3) combining existing 
technologies with new, more efficient materials. All three alternatives were rejected in the 
course of the project. Instead, one member organization filed a change request that called for 
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a complete overhaul of the existing technologies. This new technological route affected the 
distribution of development and manufacturing tasks. One company was alienated by the 
move and left the consortium, another left because it no longer envisioned prosperous 
business opportunities for itself. However, the remaining partners eventually agreed to follow 
the new route suggested.  
 
Development over time: Subsequently, a new project was started, specifically aimed at 
developing the components necessary for the new technology. The idea of the project was to 
develop a "toolkit" that encompassed all the component parts of the new FTTH-access 
technology, each developed by a specialist company or research institute. The partners drafted 
a cooperation contract, as required by the sponsoring government body. Again, this contract 
entailed rather vague terms for both conflict resolution mechanisms and distribution patterns. 
The leadership of the project was taken on by one of the research institutes; this institute is 
known for acting as the “motor” of the industry.  
The allocation of manufacturing tasks represented the vertical value chain of the 
photonics industry. One institute designed and developed the basic platform, and another 
institute developed active filters. One company used the basic platform to equip it with fibre 
cables, thus producing so-called passive optical components. Another company would then 
buy those passive components and equip them with filters in order to turn them into so-called 
active components. According to several interviewees, this distribution of manufacturing 
tasks was “ideal” because there was no overlap of interests; it was intentionally designed by 
the leading research institute to be that way. 
Details of network-internal supplies had not yet been fixed. However, generic 
principles were already being applied. As value generation is sequential in this industry, the 
output of one company is the input of the next company. In this sequential value chain, each 
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company can take "the margin that it needs", often between 20 and 25%. Thanks to the close 
ties in the network, all member organizations know what share the other takes. This provides 
implicit upper limits on acceptable margins.  
Shortly after the second project, a third project started in 2008 in order to co-develop 
one especially intricate component of the new toolkit: the basic platform. Again, the core 
team of the previous two projects took part, supplemented by two further companies. As in 
the second project, internal deliveries were not yet regulated, as marketability was still a few 
years into the future. The distribution of manufacturing tasks resembled that of previous 
projects. As before, a loose cooperation contract was signed in order to fulfil the formal 
requirements of the sponsoring government body.  
 
Path analysis: In this case, it is yet unclear whether there has been a path-dependent 
development of the bargaining practice. Signs of path dependence appear most convincingly 
in case of the distribution of tasks. The technological alternatives of the first project each 
implied a different task distribution (I1 + I2). The successful change request thus fixed the 
initial distribution of tasks (I3).  
Subsequently, coordination effects and complementarities formed self-reinforcing 
mechanisms that have stabilised the bargaining practice in a path formation phase. All the 
partners involved have provided complementary inputs to develop the toolkit technology 
(I5d) at ever increasing rates (I4). At the same time, no partner could substitute another's input 
(I5c). After the change request, no partner has ever deviated from the bargaining practice (I5a 
+ I5b). Alternatives to the toolkit technology are increasingly unlikely to be attempted by 
Photonics Network (I6). 
However, it is far from clear that the technology will be successful on the market, so 
that a lock-in phase cannot yet be detected. It has yet to be shown whether there will be a 
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replication of the bargaining practice once the product is introduced onto the market (I7). 
Different technologies will bring along different distributions of manufacturing tasks and 
different internal supply arrangements. It follows that alternatives have not been marginalized 
yet (I8) and that the partners can still change the course of their developments instead of being 
“unwilling”, “unaware” or “unable” (I9). 
Besides the distribution of manufacturing tasks, rules for network-internal deliveries 
have yet to be established, both because the cooperation contracts leave these questions open 
and because the technology has not progressed far enough yet to answer these questions. It 
also remains unclear whether any future rules will be codified in contracts or not. 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
A cross-case analysis shows that within at least two cases, bargaining practices have become 
quite stable over time. This can be accounted for by the theory of organizational path 
dependence, which directs attention to three phases and, in particular, to the effect of self-
reinforcing mechanisms in the path formation phase. Actually, there seems to be evidence of a 
preformation and a path formation phase in all three networks, and evidence for a lock-in 
phase in two of the three networks. The subsequent discussion of the cross-case analysis is 
summarized in figure 8 below. 
 To begin with, there is evidence of a preformation phase in all cases. Initially, 
alternative bargaining practices are discussed and tested in all cases (I1 + I2). A small event 
has then favoured one solution over its alternatives (I3). As would be expected from 
ultimately decisive events that are "not expected to take place" (Mahoney, 2000: 531), their 
nature varies: a trial and error phase in Surface Network, a supplementary agreement as well 
as the foundation of the official network in X-Ray Network, and a change request in 
Photonics Network.  
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There also seems to be evidence of a path formation phase. Subsequent increases (I4) 
can be observed in all cases, as can diminishing alternatives (I6). Self-reinforcing mechanisms 
based on coordination effects and complementarities work in parallel in all three cases. 
Unilateral deviations (I5a) were not attempted (Photonics Network) or had to be compensated 
for (X-Ray Network). In Surface Network, we even found a situation in which an attempt to 
change the bargaining practice was undertaken yet failed because the network members were 
unable to agree to a re-distribution. Similarly, joint deviations (I5b) were not attempted 
(Surface Network and Photonics Network) or had to be compensated for (X-Ray Network). 
Internal substitutions (I5c) have not taken place since the small events in any of the three 
cases. Instead, a virtuous cycle (I5d) of mutual co-investments in the joint capabilities was 
triggered in X-Ray Network and Photonics Network.  
Lastly, a lock-in phase seems to have occurred in Surface Network and X-Ray 
Network. In both these networks, the initially adopted bargaining practices have been 
replicated several times (I7). At the same time, the number of remaining alternatives has been 
diminishing but is not down to zero (I8), as the partners actively uphold alternative 
cooperation partners by occasionally working together with them. The type of lock-in (I9) 
seems to be "unwilling" for both Surface Network and X-Ray Network. In Surface Network, 
“unable” is also discernable. For Photonics Network, a lock-in cannot be diagnosed (yet), as 
the core technology developed by its members has not (yet) matured to marketability. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
INSERT FIGURE 8 ABOUT HERE 
-------------------------------------------- 
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Three conclusions can be drawn from this discussion of the cross-case analysis. First, 
this paper shows that bargaining practices in inter-organizational networks can indeed exhibit 
path dependencies; a supplementing inertia-import from organizations (Walker et al., 1997). 
Second, it reconstructs the temporal ordering of events that may lead to such a situation: 
starting from a situation in which several alternative bargaining arrangements are on a more 
or less equal footing, a small event – which can take various forms – sets off a self-reinforcing 
process based on both coordination effects and complementarities, which increasingly favours 
one solution and diminishes its alternatives. This process may even lead to a lock-in where 
one solution is replicated over and over again, making the adoption of alternatives ever more 
unlikely. As bargaining practices are one particular type of network management or relational 
practice, the third conclusion of this paper is that inter-organizational networks as such can – 
but do not need to – become path-dependent by a sequence of events similar to the one just 
described. 
This paper’s contribution is twofold. First, we have operationalized the abstract three-
phase model of organizational path dependence with nine empirical indicators. We have also 
operationalized the core of path dependence by finding sub-indicators for two types of self-
reinforcing mechanisms – coordination effects and complementarities. This has enabled us to 
directly compare our three cases and identify similar patterns across them. We suspect that 
such an operationalization may also enable cross-comparison between different studies, thus 
helping to unify the research on organizational path dependence by providing a common 
framework of reference for empirical analyses. 
Second, our study contributes to the debate on the stability of network forms of 
organization (Kim et al., 2006). It could be shown that in all three cases, the network 
bargaining practices emerged through processes that featured small events, were stabilised by 
self-reinforcing mechanisms, and – in two out of three cases – resulted in inter-organizational 
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lock-ins. All three phases of a path-dependent development trajectory can be detected in the 
bargaining practices investigated, even though the individual practices differ substantially 
from each other. Thus, practices in network forms of organization are not flexible a priori but 
can become rather stable and even locked-in. 
Having established some evidence of the general proposition that inter-organizational 
networks may become path-dependent, it seems worthwhile to ask further research questions 
addressing both the pre-conditions and the consequences of path dependence. First, one may 
explore which preconditions may predispose a network to develop in a path-dependent 
fashion. For instance, initially shared interpretative schemes might aid the development of 
commonly agreed and acted upon routines. What, in particular, might be the role of early 
network imprints in this process (Milanov & Fernhaber, 2007)? Second, one may explore how 
path dependence affects the performance of networks. Do path-dependent networks, for 
instance, produce higher benefits from cooperation? Answering both types of questions would 
require a comparison of the development trajectories of path-dependent and path-independent 
networks. 
Certainly, the major limitation of this study is that it is focused on three cases only and 
has utilized purpose-built instruments to collect and analyse data on organizational path 
dependencies of network management practices. Nevertheless, this research – in line with 
other recent network studies (Manning & Sydow, 2011; Maurer & Ebers, 2006) – puts a 
question mark behind the alleged flexibility of the network form of organizing. In addition, it 
challenges recent interests in studying strategic alliance and inter-organizational networks by 
focussing exclusively on the formality of contractual arrangements (Arino & Reuer, 2005) 
while ignoring the influence of informal practices. At the very least, a focus on relational 
practices in general and bargaining practices in particular nicely complements former network 
research, which has been concentrating more on governance aspects so far (for recent reviews 
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of network research see Borgatti & Foster, 2003; see also Ness, 2009; Provan, Fish, & 
Sydow, 2007; Zaheer, Gözübüyük, & Milanov, 2010). 
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Figure 1: The Constitution of an Organizational Path (Sydow et al., 2009: 692)´ 
 
 
Figure 2: Nine empirical indicators derived from the theory of organizational path dependence 
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Figure 3: A simple bargaining game 
 
 
Figure 4: Indicators for coordination effects and complementarities 
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Figure 5: The “Surface Network” 
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Figure 6: The “X-Ray Network” 
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Figure 7: The “Photonics Network” 
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Figure 8: Cross-case comparison of path indicators 
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